Is the philosophy of mechanism philosophy enough?
Recognition of the widespread use of the word 'mechanism' in bio-molecular research has resulted in the concept of 'mechanism' becoming a focal point for a highly visible group of philosophers of biology. Rather, however, than grasping and elucidating the situated aims and practices of biologists themselves, the philosophical investigation of the contemporary meaning of mechanism in biology has been commandeered by the needs of 'hard naturalists' to replace the old deductive-nomological model of the 'received view' with a new normative-explanatory gold-standard. It is argued that rather than an orientation toward an increasingly precise characterization of mechanisms as being an ultimate end in biological research, in actual biological practice 'mechanism' means different things in different contexts, pragmatically draws on our embodied know-how in the use of machines and is not, nor should be, an ultimate end of biological research. Further, it is argued, that classic work on low-level mechanisms became taken up qualitatively as parts of the scaffolding for investigating higher level regulatory processes and that in so doing, and in light of new findings such as that of the regulatory significance of 'pleiomorphic ensembles' and 'intrinsically unstructured proteins' the explanatory limits of the mechanism image have already come into view.